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NOTES
Extradition: The Statute of Limitations is Tolled By
Constructive Flight-Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478. (1976).
A PPROXIMATELY ELEVEN YEARS after the occurrence of
alleged acts of embezzlement, the Government of India requested
the extradition of Elijah Ephraim Jhirad from the United States. The
Treaty of Extradition between the requesting and requested states pro-
vided that extradition could not take place if the statute of limitations
in both countries was tolled. Jhirad was charged with a non-capital of-
fense. Section 3282 of Title 18 of the U.S.C. allows a five year statute
of limitations in all non-capital cases but the statute is tolled by "any
person fleeing from justice,"' The response to the confusion generated
by the interpretation of this phrase has led to a series of inconsistent
circuit court opinions. Some courts have held that absence from the
jurisdiction sufficed to toll the statute while others felt that the key
factor was the existence of an intent to evade justice. The Second Cir-
cuit, in an unprecedented opinion, held that "constructive flight" was
sufficient to toll the statute. Whether this term has changed the focus
of the inquiry under the statute or whether it is merely new terminology
used to express the intent to examine the reason behind an absence
from the charging state's jurisdiction will be discussed below., A brief
description of the history of extradition, its purpose and its policies will
follow in order that an interpretation of this phrase in keeping with
these policies can be proposed.
I. THE HISTORY OF EXTRADITION
By one's decision to join a community, that individual chooses to
surrender his absolute freedom for the security and predictability that
arises from the creation of a stable community.2 This self-imposed
limitation is based upon the practical realization that each individual's
absolute freedom, if exercised, would infringe upon that of other like
individuals. Once larger communities are established, the rights of all
the individual members must be considered. State government
18 U.S.C. § 3290 (1970) states that: "No statute of limitations shall extend to
any person fleeing from justice."
"When one becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts with some rights
or privileges which, as an individual not affected by his relations to others, he might
retain." Munn v. Ill., 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1877).
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developed to insure that this consideration would take place.
Therefore, the state has been given the power to create a balance be-
tween the personal rights of the individual and those of the other
members of society.' The state has a legitimate interest in protecting
all the rights of its members. This goal has been achieved through the
promulgation of criminal codes by each sovereign state. These codes
define those acts that unnecessarily infringe upon the fundamental
rights of others. Effective enforcement of these laws assures that the
rights of every citizen will be protected. A violation of these rules by an
individual is a threat to the entire structure of the society. The state,
therefore, in order to properly fulfill its role must make certain that no
violations take place and must punish those that do occur. Failure to
do so would be a breach of its duty to the individual members of socie-
ty to provide the safety for which they originally surrendered their
rights. The predictability and stability that they desired would be ab-
sent and with it the very reasons for denying their total freedom.
Suppression of crime transcends national borders. 4 As national
boundries became more firmly established, each state became a refuge
for the violators of the laws of another state. Flight from the communi-
ty whose laws had been violated became a method of escaping the
power of the state to enforce compliance with its regulations. Because
each state has an interest in enforcing its own criminal code there was
an early interest in the international surpression of crime.5
The shifting pattern of habitation from village to city, the greater
mobility caused by advances in technology, and the resulting lessening
of xenophobia prompted the creation of a formal arrangement to
answer such questions as:
a) How can the state punish an individual once he has fled
its borders;
"The whole people convenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the
whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good." Id.
4 1 J. MOORE, EXTRADITION 113 (1891). This is a 19th century treatise that is
an excellent source of information on the history of extradition.
I Id. at 8-9. An early obstacle to extradition was the notion of asylum. In an-
cient Rome if any state was in alliance with Rome an investigator was appointed to in-
vestigate and deliver up any party who had offended the laws of the state.
Some early examples of American extradition treaties include: The Treaty of
Amity, Commerce, and Navigation (The Jay Treaty), Nov. 19, 1794, Great Britain-
United States, art. 27, 605 Malloy 590; The Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Aug. 9,
1842, Great Britain-United States, 93 Consol. T.S. 415.
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b) How the fleeing criminal can be returned involuntarily to
the jurisdiction whose laws he has violated for proper
punishment in keeping with his violation;
c) What will be the applicable statute of limitations for the
prosecution of these crimes?
Because a sovereign state cannot exercise judicial power over
foreign citizens or territory absent an agreement, offenders who fled
the jurisdiction of the state would in most cases go unpunished.6 Under
traditional concepts of international law one government has no right
to enter the territory of another to enforce its laws, especially laws that
may not be applicable in the other jurisdiction. 7 This need for a pro-
cess by which fugitives from the laws of one state who fled to another
might be surrendered, or extradited, in part was the result of a lack of
any practical alternatives to the problem of such flight.8 Abduction is
a possibility, but it is not, nor is it going to be a widely accepted solu-
tion. In the first place, it represents a serious infringement on the
sovereignty of the state in which the accused is currently located and
secondly, it would be a very inefficient process which would result in
most offenders going unapprehended. Assumption of jurisdiction by
the state in which the offender is located is another possibility. In ap-
plication however, it is an unsatisfactory solution because of the
disparity between the penalties imposed by different states for the same
6 2 J. MOORE. DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 243 (1906). Criminal jurisdiction
is based ,on two theories: (1) territorial; actual (when the offense is committed within
the territory) and constructive (when the place of the offense is deemed to be the ter-
ritory such as aboard a ship flying the flag of a certain state), and (2) non-territorial
(such as citizenship). In the United States the basis of criminal jurisdiction is the place
of the crime or territorial jurisdiction.
I The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive
and absolute. It is susceptible to no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restric-
tion upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminu-
tion of its sovereignty to the same extent in that power which would impose such
restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a na-
tion within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation
itself.
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 9 U.S. 116, 136 (1812).
8 1 J. MOORE, supra note 4, at 4. Extradition has been likened to a contract;
the two or more states are the parties, the subject matter is the delivery of the
criminal, and the suppression of crime is the consideration.
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crime. 9 In addition, procedural and other safeguards differ widely be-
tween states. Absent some assurance that a majority of states would
adopt this notion of jurisdictional assumption, most criminals would
gravitate to those non-cooperative states. While the use of border
patrols might alleviate this problem, the costs associated with such a
program would be prohibitive. The astronomical expense of maintain-
ing guarded borders allowing entry only to those individuals without
criminal records would render this alternative impractical.' 0 Deporta-
tion of all known foreign criminals within the state's borders, while
possible, is not only expensive but inefficient." Given the lack of prac-
tical alternatives, most states have chosen to enter bilateral and/or
multilateral treaties of extradition with other states.1 2 The value of this
solution is that the signatory nations can specifically delineate the of-
fenses, persons, and methods whereby the fleeing criminals will be sur-
rendered to the requesting state. Because the power granted by a trea-
ty need only be invoked upon the occurrence of an event that triggers
extradition, it represents an efficient allocation of resources and
eliminates the above mentioned procedures and practices required to
provide compliance with an individual state's criminal code. Further-
more, it accomplishes the goal of protecting the rights of all citizens by
punishing all violators despite their attempt to escape the jurisdiction
of the national government, while at the same time upholding the
sovereignty of both states.
II. THE SOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES' EXTRADITION POWERS
Because individual municipal laws can not be enforced outside of
the promulgating states' jurisdiction, the extradition of a fleeing of-
fender from one country to another requires international interaction
among states. In the United States, despite the fact that the individual
9 2 J. MOORE, supra note 6, at 225, "No act committed in one country, however
criminal, according to its laws, is criminal according to the laws of the other. Crimes,
in the legal sense, are local, and are so only because acts constituting them are
declared to be so by the laws of the country where they are perpetrated." Id.
'0 I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (1971).
1 The act of deportation merely expels an unwanted foreigner from the territory
of the state while extradition causes the individual's return to a requesting state for
trial. Interpol (The International Police Organization) can aid in this process of expul-
sion if the crime is of an international nature. Interpol only provides information to
national police which concerns known criminals. It does not handle the type of
fugitives that an extradition treaty would reach. Id. at 202.
12 For a list of the United States' treaties see TREATIES IN FORCE (1977).
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states promulgate laws and punish breaches of their own criminal
codes, the national government is responsible for all international
obligations including those associated with the extradition of criminal
offenders. This division of power is made clear under the municipal
law of the United States. Under the United States Constitution the
Federal government has the power "to define and punish piracies and
felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of
nations.' 3 It specifically states that "no state shall enter into any Trea-
ty, Alliance, or confederation.' 4 The President, as representative of
the United States for all international agreements, is given the "power,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties."' 5
Case law supports this division of power for international obligations.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Rauscher stated that:
There is no necessity for the states to enter upon relations with
foreign nations which are necessarily implied in the extradition of
fugitives from justice found within the limits of the state."1
The President's power cannot be arbitrarily exercised.' 7 The require-
ment for Senate approval grows out of the need to insure that the
rights of the individuals to be extradited will be considered in the trea-
ty making process. Congress has provided additional safeguards to in-
sure the protection of the individual offenders. Legislation has been
enacted that balances the need of the requesting state to punish
violators of its criminal code no matter where they are located, with
the right of an individual to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion. This balance was struck in § 3184 of Title 18 of the U.S.C.
which states that:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the
United States and any foreign government, any justice or judge of the
United States, or any magistrate authorized so to do by a court of the
United States, or any judge of a court of record of general jurisdic-
tion of any State, may, upon complaint made under oath, charging
"3 U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 10.
14 Id. §10.
1" Id. art. 2, §2.
16 119 U.S. 407, 414 (1886).
17 "The Constitution creates no executive prerogative to dispose of the liberty of
the individual. Proceedings against him must be authorized by law. There is no ex-
ecutive direction to surrender him to a foreign government." Valentine v. United
States ex tel. Neidecker, 229 U.S. 5, 8 (1936).
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any person found within his jurisdiction, with having committed
within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the
crimes provided for by such treaty or convention, issue his warrant
for the apprehension of the person so charged, that he may be
brought before such justice, judge, or magistrate, to the end that the
evidence of criminality may be heard and considered. If, on such
hearing, he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under
the provisions of the proper treaty or convention, he shall certify the
same, together with a copy of all testimony taken before him, to the
Secretary of State. . .
The procedure for extradition is initiated by the filing of a com-
plaint.' 9 At this time, the requesting government presents facts in an
effort to establish that probable cause exists, that a crime has been
committed, that the fugitive was involved in the crime, and that the
crime is an extraditable offense. A warrant is then issued and a hear-
ing held at which time the requesting government presents evidence as
to the fugitive's identity and his involvement in a crime that is ex-
traditable under the treaty.
For a number of reasons a fugitive is not given a full trial to deter-
mine his guilt or innocence. In the first place, it would be difficult for
a court in one state to rule on questions of fact that have occurred in
another jurisdiction. Secondly, "it is not the business of . ..courts to
assume the responsibility for supervising the integrity of the judicial
system of another sovereign nation."2 0 The requesting state must
therefore prove a prima facie case with evidence as to all the elements
of the crime established according to the law of the jurisdiction in
which the fugitive was found.2' The only issue facing the court is the
narrow question of whether there is sufficient evidence to justify a
trial. 22
Before such an inquiry is undertaken it must be determined
whether the crime committed by the fugitive is an act deemed to be an
8 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1970) provides that: "The Secretary of State may order the
person committed under section 3184 ... to be delivered to any authorized agent of such
foreign government .... .. Thus the Secretary acting for the executive branch of
government can review the case and decide whether to extradite or not.
19 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 935 (1968).
20 Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484 (2d Cir. 1976).
21 Application for the Extradition of D'Amico, 185 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y.
1960), appeal dismissed; Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1973) (state law
defines the elements of a treaty of extradition offense).
2 Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913) (a hearing is not a trial).
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extraditable offense under the extradition treaty. 2" Acts enumerated in
such treaties are not made crimes by their presence in the documents,
but are acts so held by the signatory states to be violations sufficient to
trigger a return for trial in the requesting state. 24 There are two main
methods of formulating the offenses that will trigger extradition under
a treaty: enumeration and elimination. 25 In the former, an exhaustive
list of offenses is included in the treaty itself specifically enumerating
all acts that will cause surrender to a requesting state. In the latter,
the crimes are described only in terms of the period of time at-
tributable to their violation. The United States prefers the enumerative
type in that it provides a specific document that details the limits of its
responsibility. In addition, the "no list" treaties, as the latter are call-
ed, present a problem when the judicial systems involved are incom-
patible. The laws of one state might provide for a harsher penalty for
a crime than those of another state. Since the object of the treaty
is to insure that neither party will have to surrender to the other in-
dividuals whose crime would not be extraditable under the laws of the
requested state, this is unsatisfactory. To eliminate this problem some ex-
tradition treaties only require that the offense committed be criminal
under the laws of both signatories. This solution also deals with the
difficult problem of describing offenses that differ in name in the
criminal codes of the treaty states but describe the same acts.
26
The United States has opposed the "no list" extradition treaty but
most other states are adopting this approach because of the ease of in-
corporating crimes omitted from the original version of the treaty. 27
Because they are easier to administer, the "no list" treaties are more
practical. They eliminate the time-consuming and expensive negotia-
tions that are necessary under enumerative treaties to incorporate
omitted or additional extraditable offenses.
23 6 M. WIITEMAN, supra note 19, at 734. In the United States extradition can
only be accomplished through a treaty or other agreement.
24 1 J. MOORE, supra note 4, at 113. "[A]ll offenses which nations have a com-
mon interest in punishing should be subject to extradition. The object to be ac-
complished in all these cases is . . . the punishment of malefactors, the common
enemy of every society." Id.
25 I. SHEARER, supra note 10, at 134.
26 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 19, at 772.
2' As of 1971, 84 countries preferred the "no list" to the enumerative type of
treaty. I. SHEARER, supra note 10, at 219.
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A. Rules of Intrepretation for Extradition Treaties
The responsibility of characterizing certain acts as crimes rests
ultimately with the municipal courts of a state for they must determine
whether an act is a crime under its criminal code. In order to insure
that an individual is deprived of his freedom only in a jurisdiction in
which his alleged act would constitute a crime, the practice arose by
which extradition would only take place if the acts sought to be
punished were violative of the criminal laws of both states. Once this
rule of 'double criminality' is satisfied, the courts must next determine
whether the offense listed in the treaty must be the exact crime
punishable in both jurisdictions or whether the acts themselves were
sufficient to trigger extradition. The Supreme Court has resolved this
problem in the United States by ruling that a strict translation of the
name of the crime was not necessary so long as the elements of the of-
fense were similar in both countries.2" Therefore, so long as the crime
in the requesting country is similar in composition to that of the crime
under which extradition is sought, this rule has been satisfied.
After a court determines that a crime is listed in the treaty or is
recognized by both signatory states as a basis for surrender to a re-
questing state, the next problem the court faces is that of burden of
proof. If the requested fugitive is a convicted criminal, only a certified
copy of the final sentence passed at his trial is necessary for his ex-
tradition. An accused offender however, is given a hearing. 2 At this
hearing a determination is made that he be extradited for trial on the
charge based on the evidence presented by the requesting state.
An accused or convicted individual is not subject to the threat of
extradition indefinately.5 0 In the United States § 3282 of Title 18 of
the U.S.C. imposes a five year statute of limitations for all non-capital
offenses. This provision may be tolled under 18 U.S.C. § 3290 which
denies the benefit of a statute of limitations "to any person fleeing
from justice." 3' In keeping with the purpose of the statute, the law
28 Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
29 Application for the Extradition of D'Amico, 185 F. Supp. at 925.
'0 Most treaties of extradition contain a statute of limitations or incorporate the
statutes of the signatories. See Extradition Treaty, Dec. 22, 1931, Great Britain-United
States, art. 5, 47 Stat. 2122, T.S. No. 849, reprinted in the appendix, infra.
11 18 U.S.C. § 3282 states that: "Except as otherwise expressly provided by law,
no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless
the indictment is found or the information is instituted within five years next after
such offense shall have been committed."
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protects only those individuals not actively seeking to avoid punishment
for their crimes.
B. Newly Independent States and Existing Extradition Treaties
Traditionally a state that established its independence began life
completely anew." It was no longer bound by the treaties of its
predecessor nor was it entitled to any of the benefits accorded its
predecessor by the other signatory. The modern approach has diverged
from this practice. Newly independent states anxious to maintain their
treaty benefits have accomplished this in two ways. One method is by
"inheritance agreement"; by specifically agreeing with its predecessor
to assume the obligations that apply to its territory, the new state
acknowledges the terms of the treaty and its willingness to abide by
them." The date of the successor state's independence becomes the ef-
fective date for the assumption of responsibilities. The second method
is novation. Here the newly independent state is required to formally
express its intention to become bound by the predecessor's treaty. Once
it receives the assent of the other signatories, all parties become
bound.3
4
III. CONSTRUCTIVE FLIGHT
A request by the government of India for the extradition of Elijah
Ephriam Jhirad, former Judge Advocate General of the Indian Navy,
resulted in a series of five cases challenging the power of the United
States Government to arrest and return him to India."5 In the petition
for extradition presented under 18 U.S.C. § 3284, the Government of
India sought Jhirad's return for trial on charges of embezzlement.
As Judge Advocate, Jhirad was given the duty of administrating a
Naval Prize Fund. This fund was established by a grant from Great
Britain that represented a portion of the revenues from the sale of cap-
tured World War II war prizes. The Prize Fund was to be distributed
to the officers and men who had served at sea during the war. In a
total of fifty-two transactions that occurred between 1959 and 1961,
Jhirad allegedly withdrew cash from the fund and then deposited all, or a
portion of each withdrawal, in his personal account." These activities
32 I. SHEARER, supra note 10, at 46.
11 For an example of this type of treaty see Treaty of Alliance, June 30, 1970,
Great Britain-Iraq, 132 L.N.T.S. 364, art. 8.
34 For an example of this type of treaty see Agreement on the Application of
French Treaties to the Congo, May 12, 1961, United States-France, 13 U.S.T. 2065,
T.I.A.S. No. 5161.
11 401 F. Supp. 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
3e 536 F.2d at 482.
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went unnoticed by the Indian Government and from 1961, when the
fund's proceeds were exhausted, until 1964, Jhirad continued to hold
his position.3 7 In February 1966, the Indian Bureau of Investigation
began an inquiry into the fund's management. Jhirad told an in-
vestigating officer in May 1966 that all records of the fund had been
destroyed with the full knowledge of his superiors.3 8 It was during this
time that the bank's records concerning the Prize Fund were sub-
poenaed.3 9
In June 1966, the Secretary General of the World Jewish Congress
invited Jhirad to attend the Fifth Plenary Assembly in Brussels in
August of that year. Jhirad's wife was also invited to attend an aux-
iliary conference of the Women's Zionist Organization to be held at the
same time. 40 From the end of June to early July the Jhirads sold
various personal possessions, including his law books, and postponed
his pending cases until October leaving a junior associate in charge.4 1
On July 2nd the Bureau officially registered a complaint against
Jhirad. However on July 19th Jhirad obtained permission from his
superiors to attend the meeting in Brussels. On the 26th of July Jhirad
left India. 42 After attending the conference he went to Switzerland
where he remained until 1967. He later traveled to Israel and in 1972
he entered the United States as a permanent resident alien.43 In the
meantime, charges were officially brought against him by the Indian
Government in 1968, two years after he had left the jurisdiction and
some five years after most of the alleged acts of embezzlement had
occurred. However, in 1972 he was arrested in New York and held for
extradition on charges of embezzlement.
4 4
Normally under § 3184, following the filing of a complaint by a
representative of the requesting state, a warrant is issued so that the
fugitive can be held in custody until a hearing can be held. A
magistrate at this hearing must first determine if the fugitive is the in-
dividual sought, and secondly, whether probable cause exists. It is very
37 486 F.2d 442, 443 (2d Cir. 1973).
1 401 F. Supp. at 1216.
19 An employee of the Central Bank of India informed Jhirad that the records
had been subpoenaed.,Id.
40 Id. at 1217.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
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difficult to contest an extradition hearing's determination in large part
because a § 3184 hearing is not a final order and is therefore unap-
pealable. In order to test the power of the court to order extradition a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be made. 4" In Jhirad 146 such
a petition was filed. Since Jhirad was free on bail pending the outcome
of the hearing, the threshold question became whether habeas corpus
relief was available to petitioners who were not in custody. In answer,
the court held that although Jhirad was not in custody "the restrictions
on his freedom. . ." were sufficient to allow the court to hear the
case. 47 A writ of habeas corpus is usually sought after the § 3184 hear-
ing has taken place but Jhirad petitioned prior to his hearing in order
to challenge the court's jurisdiction. The scope of a habeas corpus
determination is very narrow, especially in cases where no hearing has
taken place.4" Therefore, the issues before the court in Jhirad I con-
cerned the jurisdiction of the magistrate in a § 3184 hearing and
whether the offense charged in the hearing was a treaty offense." Ab-
sent a treaty between the requesting state (India) and the requested
state (the United States) there would be no basis upon which Jhirad
could be compelled to return to India. After resolving the initial ques-
tion of Jhirad's standing to sue, the next question before the court was
whether a valid treaty of extradition existed between the two countries
that could be invoked to compel his return. As a former British Col-
ony, India chose by inheritance agreement 0 to assume all of the rights
and obligations under the Treaty of December 22, 1931, originally
signed by Great Britain and the United States.5 1 The court found that
the Republic of India inherited from British India a valid and binding
treaty of extradition that would serve as the basis for the present ex-
tradition proceeding.5 2
41 Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 290 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1961); 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1970); FED. R. Civ. P. 26; United States ex rel. D'Amico v. Bishop, 286
F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1961).
46 355 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
41 Id. at 1158.
48 Id.
49 A treaty offense is one listed in the treaty as an act agreed upon by the parties
to trigger extradition.
90 See notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
51 Extradition Treaty, supra note 30.
12 See, appendix. Article 14 of the Treaty specifically mentions that Great Bri-
tain will accede to the Treaty on behalf of India.
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Once the basis for extradition was established, the court turned to
the treaty itself to determine whether the crime with which Jhirad was
charged was an extraditable offense. Jhirad allegedly embezzled large
sums of money in a total of fifty-two transactions. Turning to the trea-
ty for its authority the court noted that Article 3 of the 1931 treaty listed
"larceny or embezzlement" and "fraudulent conversion" as extraditable
offenses. Under the rules of treaty interpretation in order for an ex-
tradition to be valid the charged acts must be criminal in both
jurisdictions.5 3 Under the Indian Penal Code Jhirad was charg-
ed with criminal breach of trust of a public servant,5 4 acts that are in
essence embezzlement. While the New York statute uses different
words, 55 it is clear that they describe the crime of embezzlement. The
dual criminality rule is thus satisfied. Furthermore, in the United
States, the Supreme Court follows a rule of liberal interpretation of
general crimes enumerated in a treaty.5" Citing this rule of interpreta-
tion the court found that the acts that Jhirad committed were ex-
traditable under the treaty. Once the acts were deemed to be ex-
traditable, the court had to determine if the treaty established a
statute of limitations which was applicable to extradition offenses. Ar-
ticle 5 of the Treaty of 1931 prohibits extradition after the statute of
limitations has expired in either the requesting or requested state.5 7 In
the United States there is a five year statute of limitations for all non-
capital crimes.5s Since the alleged transaction with which Jhirad was
charged took place between 1959 and 1961 the statute would bar ex-
tradition unless it had been tolled.5 9 Under § 3290 of Title 18 of the
U.S.C. the statute is only tolled when the offender is deemed to have
"fled from justice. ' 60 When Jhirad left India in July of 1966, charges
based on any transactions five years prior to that time would be barred
by the statute unless the statute was tolled when he left the jurisdic-
tion. Therefore those transactions that did not occur within five years
5 355 F. Supp. at 1161.
14 Id. at 1160.
5 N.Y. PNAL LAW (McKinney) § 155.05 reads: "A person steals property and
commits larceny, when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate
the same to himself or to a third person he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such
property from an owner thereof."
56 290 U.S. at 276.
11 Extradition Treaty, supra note 30.
58 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1970).
59 Id. at § 3290.
60 Id.
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of that date would still be pending. There were three such transactions
that were found to have occurred during this period.6 ' The court
decided that "petitioner was fleeing from justice by his mere absence
from India in 1966" and consequently the United States' statute of
limitations had been tolled. 62
Article 5 of the Treaty of 1931 also requires that as requesting
state, India's statute of limitations must also not have tolled. The court
found that India did not have a specific statute but applied a case law
test of reasonableness. 61 Since it was not unreasonable for a crime like
embezzlement to go undetected for some time the Indian statute was
deemed not to have been tolled. The court found that on the basis of
these facts the magistrate had jurisdiction over the case. 64
Following the District Court's determination that absence alone was
sufficient to toll the statute, Jhirad, in a second petition for habeas
corpus relief, maintained that his mere absence was not sufficient to
toll the statute. Jhirad contended that when he left India he was not
"fleeing justice" for he openly requested permission to leave the
jurisdiction.
The courts in this country disagree as to the definition of the term
"fleeing from justice." A finding that mere absence from the jurisdic-
tion is sufficient to toll the statute has been upheld by a number of
courts. 65 Other courts require that an intent to flee the jurisdiction
must be proved. 66 But in response to this second appeal the court
chose to apply the mere absence test in finding that the statute had
tolled. Because Jhirad was not present in the jurisdiction the court
never inquired into the reasons for his absence. Under'this mechanical
test any absence despite its reason would cause the statute to toll. The
purpose of the statute's tolling only for those fugitives fleeing justice
would be defeated if the statute tolled whenever an offender left the
61 There were three transactions that occurred within this period; one on July
27th, and two more on the 25th and 27th of September, 1961.
62 355 F. Supp. at 1162.
63 Id.
64 Id.
61McGowen v. United States, 105 F.2d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 552 (1939); King v. United States, 144 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 854 (1945); Bruce v. Bryan, 139 F. 1022 (4th Cir. 1905).
66 "In determining whether a person charged with a crime will be denied the
right to be protected by the statute of limitations, the purpose and intent of his
absence is an important matter to be inquired into .. " Donnell v. United States,
299 F.2d 560, 565 (5th Cir. 1956). See also Brouse v. United States, 68 F.2d 294 (1st
Cir. 1933); United States v. Wazney, 529 F.2d 1287 (9th Cir. 1976).
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jurisdiction. The second argument raised by Jhirad in this petition was
that his prosecution was politically motivated. Since Article 6 of the
1931 treaty prohibits extradition for political offenses, if this charge
could have been proved the case would have been dismissed. Instead
the court dismissed this appeal for lack of evidence. 67
In the consolidated appeal from both denials of writs of habeas
corpus the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case. 68 It held
that the treaty was valid between India and the United States and
therefore the only issue before the court was whether the offense was
one for which extradition could be granted. After commenting upon
the division of opinion among the circuits, the court held that "on the
basis of the plain language and the purpose of section 3290 . . . the
government must show an intent to flee from prosecution or arrest
before the statute of limitations is tolled. '69
The case was remanded in order to make a determination on the
question of intent. On remand the magistrate found that Jhirad had
not formed an intent to flee at the time he left India. This intent
however, matured when he failed to return to India after his vacation
had expired.70 The court noted that:
Fleeing from justice carries a common sense connotation that only
those persons shall be denied the benefit of the statute of limitations
who have absented themselves from the jurisdiction with the intent of
escaping prosecution. 7
Jhirad's intent to avoid prosecution can be established by examin-
ing his reasons for residing in Switzerland, Israel and the United States
for such a long time after he could have returned to India.72 An intent
to avoid prosecution, which is really no more than a desire to avoid
punishment for a crime, can be formed at any time. When an in-
dividual does not return to the jurisdiction out of fear of possible pros-
ecution he has fled from justice."3
A desire to avoid prosecution by originally leaving the jurisdiction
or failing to return to a jurisdiction once you learn of possible prosecu-
67 362 F. Supp. 1057, 1062. "Petitioner has failed to prove that political motiva-
tion lurks behind this demand for extradition." Id.
68 486 F.2d at 442.
61 Id. at 444.
70 401 F. Supp. 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). "[T]he intent to flee matured when the
supposed vacation .. .exceeded by 150 percent the longest prior vacation." Id. at 1218.
71 486 F.2d at 444.
12 401 F. Supp. at 1218.
" "[E]ven if a defendant learns of potential prosecution while his is without a
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tion is a flight from justice. The reason behind both the original decis-
ion to leave and the subsequent one not to return are the same; a
desire to avoid the state's power to regulate the conduct of its citizens
by means of its criminal code. The original decision to leave the
jurisdiction is "flight" and a subsequent failure to return is also flight
but it is "constructive flight." An examination of the reasons for any
absence from the jurisdiction is an important factor in discovering
whether there has been "flight from justice."
A mechanical "mere absence" test is unreliable because it fails to
take into consideration the very important reasons behind an absence
and the purpose that was to be achieved by a statute of limitations. All
deliberate evasions of justice must be prohibited. In the modern world
citizens of every country leave their place of birth, international travel
and prolonged residence in a foreign state are frequent occurrences.
Absence can be considered flight only when prompted by a decision
not to return in order to avoid criminal prosecution. In enacting 18
U.S.C. § 3290 Congress intended that a balance be struck be-
tween the interests of a foreign government in prosecuting domestic
crime and that of the United States in protecting individuals who are
lawfully within its borders. While "constructive flight" is without
precedent it is "fully supported by both the language and logic of 18
U.S.C. § 3290."1 4 This has not changed the focus of the inquiry under
the statute but is in keeping with its purpose. A statute of limitations is
not designed to protect criminals by serving as a defense to their
deliberate evasion, nor is it designed to disrupt the lives of individuals
who innocently leave a jurisdiction with no intent to escape their
punishment or who fail to return for some equally innocent reason.
The purpose of a treaty of extradition is to provide a procedure for
returning fugitives. The concept of "constructive flight," although
new, advances this purpose by making the intent test more practical.
This is accomplished by eliminating the distinction between those
fugitives who leave the jurisdiction with the requisite intent and those
who fail to return for the same reason. Thus the statute takes a new
step along the path toward suppression of crime.
PHYLLIS J. CULP*
state and for that reason alone chooses not to return to his normal state, there may be
a question of flight from justice." Id.
14 536 F.2d at 483.
*J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University, 1978.
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APPENDIX
EXTRADITION TREATY-UNITED STATES-GREAT BRITAIN,
December 22, 1931.
Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and
Great Britain and exchanges of notes extending the applicability of the
Treaty to Palestine and Trans-Jordan. Signed at London December 22,
1931; ratification advised by the Senate of the United States, February
19, 1932; ratified by the President of the United States, March 3,
1932; ratified by GreatBritain, July 29, 1932; ratifications exchanged
at London, August 4, 1932; proclaimed, August 9, 1932. By the Presi-
dent of The United States of America
A PROCLAMATION
Whereas an extradition treaty between the United States of
America and Great Britain was concluded and signed by their respec-
tive Plenipotentiaries at London on December 22, 1932, the original of
which treaty is word for word as follows:
The President of the United States of America, And His Majesty
the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond
the Seas, Emperor of India; Desiring to make more adequate provision
for the reciprocal extradition of criminals, Have resolved to conclude a
Treaty for that purpose, and to that end have appointed as their
plenipotentiaries;
The President of the United States of America:
General Charles G. Dawes, Ambassador Extra-ordinary and
Plenipotentiary of the United States of America at the Court of St.
James; And His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the
British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India: for Great Bri-
tain and Northern Ireland:
The Right Honourable Sir John Simon, G.C.S.I., M.P., His Prin-
cipal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Who having com-
municated their full powers, have found in good and due form, have
agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1. The High Contracting Parties engage to deliver up to
each other, under certain circumstances and conditions stated in the
present Treaty, those persons who, being accused or convicted of any
of the crimes or offenses enumerated in Article 3, committed within
the jurisdiction of the one Party, shall be found within the territory of
the other Party.
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ARTICLE 2. For the purposes of the present Treaty the territory of
His Britannic Majesty shall be deemed to be Great Britain and Nor-
thern Ireland, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, and all parts
of His Britannic Majesty's dominions overseas other than those
enumerated in Article 14 together with the territories enumerated in
Article 16 and any territories to which it may be extended under Arti-
cle 17. It is understood that in respect of all territory of His Britannic
Majesty as above defined, and the Isle of Man, the present Treaty
shall be applied as far as the laws permit.
For the purposes of the present Treaty the territory of the United
States shall be deemed to be all territory wherever situated belonging
to the United States, including its dependencies and all other ter-
ritories under its exclusive administration or control.
ARTICLE 3. Extradition shall be reciprocally granted for the follow-
ing crimes or offences:
1. Murder, including assassination, parricide, infanticide,
poisoning, or attempt or conspiracy to murder.
2. Manslaughter.
3. Administering drugs or using instruments with intent to
procure the miscarriages of women.
4. Rape.
5. Unlawful carnal knowledge, or any attempt to have unlawful
carnal knowledge, of a girl under 16 years of age.
6. Indecent assault if such crime or offence be indictable in the
place where the accused or convicted person is apprehended.
7. Kidnapping or false imprisonment.
8. Child stealing, including abandoning, exposing or unlawfully
detaining.
9. Abduction.
10. Procuration: that is to say the procuring or transporting of a
woman or girl under age even with her consent, for immoral
purposes or of a woman or girl over age, by fraud, threats, or
compulsion, for such purposes with a view in either case to
gratifying the passions of another person provided that such
crime or offence is punishable by imprisonment for at least
one year or by more severe punishment.
11. Bigamy.
12. Maliciously wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm.
13. Threats, by letter or otherwise, with intent to extort money or
other things of value.
1978]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
14. Perjury, or subornation of perjury.
15. Arson.
16. Burglary or housebreaking, robbery with violence, larceny or
embezzlement.
17. Fraud by a bailee, banker, agent, factor trustee, director,
member, or public officer of any company, or fraudulent
conversion.
18. Obtaining money, valuable security, or other property,
knowing the same to have been stolen or unlawfully obtained.
19. (a) Counterfeiting or altering money, or bringing into
circulation counterfeited or altered money.
(b) Knowingly and without lawful authority making or having
in possession any instrument, tool or engine adapted and
intended for the counterfeiting of coin.
20. Forgery, or uttering what is forged.
21. Crimes or offences against bankruptcy law.
22. Bribery, defined to be the offering, giving or receiving of
bribes.
23. Any malicious act done with intent to endanger the safety of
any persons travelling or being upon a railway.
24. Crimes or offences or attempted crimes or offences in con-
nection with the traffic in dangerous drugs.
25. Malicious injury to property, if such crime or offence be
indictable.
26. (a) Piracy by the law of nations.
(b) Revolt, or conspiracy to revolt, by two or more persons on
board a ship on the high seas against the authority of the
master; wrongfully sinking or destroying a vessel at sea, or
attempting to do so; assaults on board a ship on the high
seas, with intent to do grievous bodily harm.
27. Dealing in slaves.
Extradition is also to be granted for participation in any of the afor-
said crimes or offences, provided that such participation be punishable
by laws of both High Contracting Parties.
ARTICLE 4. The extradition shall not take place if the person claim-
ed has already been tried and discharged or punished, or is still under
trial in the territories of the High Contracting Party applied to, for the
crime or offence for which his extradition is demanded.
If the person claimed should be under examination or under
punishment in the territories of the High Contracting Party applied to
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for any other crime or offence, his extradition shall be deferred until
the conclusion of the trial and full execution of any punishment
awarded to him.
ARTICLE 5. The extradition shall not take place if, subsequently to
the commission of the crime or offence or the institution of the penal
prosecution or the conviction thereon, exemption from prosecution or
punishment has been acquired by lapse of time, according to the laws
of the High Contracting Party applying or applied to.
ARTICLE 6. A fugitive shall not be surrendered if the crime or of-
fence in respect of which his surrender is demanded is one of a
political character, ' or if he proves that the requisition for his surrender
has, in fact, been made with a view to try or punish him for a crime
or offence of a political character.
ARTICLE 7. A person surrendered can in no case be kept in custody
or be brought to trial in the territories of the High Contracting Party
to whom the surrender has been made for any other crime or offence,
or on account of any other matters, than those for which the extradi-
tion shall have taken place, until he has been restored, or has had an
opportunity of returning, to the territories of the High Contracting
Party by whom he has been surrendered.
This stipulation does not apply to crimes or offences committed
after the extradition.
ARTICLE 8. The extradition of fugitive criminals under the provisions
of this Treaty shall be carried out in the United States and in the ter-
ritory of His Britannic Majesty respectively, in conformity with the laws
regulating extradition for the time being in force in the territory from
which the surrender of the fugitive criminal is claimed.
ARTICLE 9. The extradition shall take place only if the evidence be
found sufficient, according to the laws of the High Contracting Party
applied to, either to justify the committal of the prisoner for trial, in
case the crime or offence had been committed in the territory of such
High Contracting Party, or to prove that the prisoner is the identical
person convicted by the courts of the High Contracting Party who
makes the requisition, and that the crime or offence of which he has
been convicted is one in respect of which extradition could, at the time
of such conviction, have been granted by the High Contracting Party
applied to.
ARTICLE 10. If the individual claimed by one of the High Contrac-
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ting Parties in pursuance of the present Treaty should be also claimed
by one or several other Powers on account of other crimes or offences
committed within their respective jurisdictions, his extradition shall be
granted to the Power whose claim is earliest in date unless such claim
is waived.
ARTICLE 11. If sufficient evidence for the extradition be not produc-
ed within two months from the date of the apprehension of the
fugitive, or within such further time as the High Contracting Party ap-
plied to, or the proper tribunal of such High Contracting Party, shall
direct, the fugitive shall be set at liberty.
ARTICLE 12. All articles seized which were in the possession of the
person to be surrendered at the time of his apprehension, and any ar-
ticles that may serve as a proof of the crime or offence shall be given
up when the extradition takes place, in so far as this may be permitted
by the law of the High Contracting Party granting the extradition.
ARTICLE 13. All expenses connected with the extradition shall be
borne by the High Contracting Party making the application.
ARTICLE 14. His Britannic Majesty may accede to the present Treaty
on behalf of any of his Dominions hereafter named-that is to say, the
Dominion of Canada, The Commonwealth of Australia including for
this purpose Papua and Norfork Island, the Dominion of New
Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the Irish Free State, and New-
foundland- and India. Such accession shall be effected by a notice to
that effect given by the appropriate diplomatic representative of His
Majesty at Washington which shall specify the authority to which the
requisition for the surrender of a fugitive criminal who has taken
refuge in the Dominion concerned, or India, as the case may be, shall
be addressed. From the date when such notice comes into effect the
territory of the Dominion concerned or of India shall be deemed to be
territory of His Britannic Majesty for the purposes of the present Trea-
ty.
The requisition for the surrender of a fugitive criminal who has
taken refuge in any of the above-mentioned Dominions or India, on
behalf of which His Britannic Majesty has acceded, shall be made by
the appropriate diplomatic or consular officer of the United States of
America.
Either High Contracting Party may terminate this Treaty separate-
ly in respect of any of the above-mentioned Dominions or India. Such
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termination shall be effective by a notice given in accordance with the
provisions of Article 18.
Any notice given under the first paragraph of this Article in
respect of one of His Britannic Majesty's Dominions may include any
territory in respect of which a mandate on behalf of the League of Na-
tions has been accepted by His Britannic Majesty, and which is being
administered by the Government of the Dominion concerned; such ter-
ritory shall, if so included, be deemed to be territory of His Britannic
Majesty for the purposes of the present Treaty. Any notice given under
the third paragraph of this Article shall be applicable to such man-
dated territory.
ARTICLE 15. The requisition for the surrender of a fugitive criminal
who has taken refuge in any territory of His Britannic Majesty other
than Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Channel Islands, or the
Isle of Man, or the Dominions or India mentioned in Article 14, shall
be made to the Governor or chief authority, of such territory by the
appropriate consular officer of the United States of America.
Such requisition shall be dealt with by the competent authorities of
such territory; provided, nevertheless, that if an order for the commit-
tal of the fugitive criminal to prison to await surrender shall be made,
the said Governor or chief authority may, instead of issuing a warrant
for the surrender of such a fugitive, refer the matter to His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland.
ARTICLE 16. This Treaty shall apply in the same manner as if they
were Possessions of His Britannic Majesty to the following British Pro-
tectorates, that is to say, the Bechuanaland Protectorate, Gambia Pro-
tectorate, Kenya Protectorate, Nigeria Protectorate, Northern
Rhodesia, Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, Nyasaland, Sierra
Leone Protectorate, Solomon Islands Protectorate, Somaliland Protec-
torate, Swaziland, Uganda Protectorate and Zanzibar, and to the
following territories in respect of which a mandate on behalf of the
League of Nations has been accepted by His Britannic Majesty, that is
to say, Cameroons under British mandate, Togoland under British
mandate, and the Tanganyika Territory.
ARTICLE 17. If after the signature of the present Treaty it is con-
sidered advisable to extend its provisions to any British Protectorates
other than those mentioned in the preceding Article or to any British
protected State, or to any territory in respect of which a mandate on
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behalf of the League of Nations has been accepted by His Britannic
Majesty, other than those mandated territories mentioned in Articles
14 and 16, the stipulations of Articles 14 and 15 shall be deemed to
apply to such Protectorates or States or mandated territories from the
date and in the manner prescribed in the notes to be exchanged for
the purpose of effecting such extension.
ARTICLE 18. The present Treaty shall come into force ten days after
its publication, in conformity with the forms prescribed by the laws of
the High Contracting Parties. It may be terminated by either of the
High Contracting Parties by a notice not exceeding one year and not
less than six months.
In the absence of an express provision to that effect, a notice given
under the first paragraph of this Article shall not affect the operation
of the Treaty as between the United States of America and any ter-
ritory in respect of which notice of accession has been given under Ar-
ticle 14.
The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be
exchanged at London as soon as possible.
On the coming into force of the present Treaty the provisions of
Article 10 of the Treaty of the 9th August, 1842, of the Convention of
the 12th July, 1889, of the supplementary Convention of the 13th
December, 1900, and the supplementary Convention of the 12th April,
1905 relative to extradition, shall cease to have effect, save that in the
case of each of the Dominions and India, mentioned in Article 14,
those provisions shall remain in force until such Dominion or India
shall have acceded to the present Treaty in accordance with Article 14
or until replaced by other treaty arrangements.
In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the
present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.
Done in duplicate at London this twenty-second day of December
1931.
John Simon
Charles G. Dawes
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